Journal of Business Accounting and Finance Perspectives
(ISSN: 2603-7475) Open Access Journal
JBAFP 2020, 2(3), 16; doi: 10.35995/jbafp2030016
1 Universidad de Salamanca, Instituto Multidisciplinar de Empresas-IME, Campus Miguel de Unamuno, Salamanca, España;
2 Departamento de Ciências Sociais Aplicadas, Universidade Estadual de Feira de Santana (UEFS), Salvador, Bahia, Brazil;
* Corresponding author:
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 18 Sep 2019 / Revised: 3 May 2020 / Accepted: 20 May 2020 / Published: 10 Jun 2020
From a theoretical point of view, corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure actions have associated a large list of benefits as a result of the lower information asymmetry problems that provoke firms to enjoy better financial conditions and higher market value. However, empirically there is no unanimity in the academy about these positive impacts. In this paper, we consider that the possible discretionary decision that managers could have in the elaboration of CSR reporting implies distrust about the credibility and utility of sustainability information. In this regard, the presence of independence in boards and directors that ensure better control of management decision could moderate the relationship between the quality of CSR reports and their benefits. Independent directors, in their decision-making process, associate their personal image, reputation, and career with CSR disclosures. For an international sample of analysis, our empirical evidence supports the premise that the market only positively assesses the utility and comparability of corporate social responsibility information, giving firms a superior value when there is a complementary mechanism that guarantees information credibility.
Keywords: CSR; disclosure; firm performance; cost of capital; information asymmetry; independent directors
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).
García-Sánchez, I.-M.; Martínez-Ferrero, J.; Azevedo, T. Does Capital Market Distrust CSR Reporting? Economic Benefits in Presence of Complementary Monitoring Mechanism. JBAFP 2020, 2, 16.
García-Sánchez I-M, Martínez-Ferrero J, Azevedo T. Does Capital Market Distrust CSR Reporting? Economic Benefits in Presence of Complementary Monitoring Mechanism. Journal of Business Accounting and Finance Perspectives. 2020; 2(3):16.
García-Sánchez, Isabel-María; Martínez-Ferrero, Jennifer; Azevedo, Tania. 2020. "Does Capital Market Distrust CSR Reporting? Economic Benefits in Presence of Complementary Monitoring Mechanism." JBAFP 2, no. 3: 16.